An Issue Barack
Obama Should be Concerned About:
The Decision-Making
Milieu of the US Government
This is the full text of an article I sent to President Obama in May
2009. While some changes have been made
for clarity, no effort was made to update
the contents to accommodate what has happened in the intervening 12 years. The article has suggested a better
decision-making process for the US government in lieu of the current one which,
along with some generic misperceptions and attitudes of its citizens that were induced in them both inadvertantly and deliberately, I believe
to be largely responsible for much of the misguided US adventures abroad. And it is “the first article” cited in end
note two of article #13 labelled “World Basic Education System” on my sister
blog www.rifatafeef.blogspot.com.
The problem can be
attributed at a broader level to the generic way the American society functions
and at a more specific level to the way decisions get made in the
A good example illustrative of the generic pattern of US societal functioning would be a TV ad I saw when I was a graduate student in the US in the early 1990s. It shows a smart-looking woman in her late twenties or early thirties … She comes home with a bagful of groceries, fumbles with a sizable bunch of keys (suggesting that she is of a responsible stature), enters the apartment, stumbles on some toys (indicating that she is also a mother), dumps the grocery bag on a table, and sinks into a sofa in front of the TV, just in time for the CNN Headline News – which is on every half-hour, 24 hours a day, and seven days a week, and which is a simplified / censored report of reality for those who don’t have the time or even the inclination for details. The woman in the ad (which I found excellent and well-targeted) I believe represents the bulk of the US adult citizenry – who are so engrossed in beating the competition and keeping up with the Joneses that there is hardly time left for much else in their lives, let alone any scope for understanding what goes on around the world. The outcome of this process maintained over time – not to mention schemes that deliberately mislead the public, as we shall see later – is that the average US citizen ends up with a rather distorted perception of the world, and it is such distorted public perception that legitimates flawed decision-making. Perhaps about the only time the average American starts paying attention to what goes on elsewhere, especially to the misguided policy of one’s government around the globe, seems to be when events touch a deeper nerve and wake one from circumstance-induced stupor, when one starts seeing flag-draped coffins arriving home. And as long as gas prices are low at the pump, Americans seem to be content. (Please do not misunderstand me – I’m not saying that Americans are inhuman or even insensitive; only that their life-conditions and the way their society functions do not allow the average person to think beyond his/her more immediate concerns, even in better days!)
Supplementing the
above scenario, another couple of examples would shed light on the way
decisions get made in the
The first cartoon was in
Time magazine in the days of the Kosovo war in which NATO was bombing the roads
and bridges of
The second cartoon was
in Newsweek. At the time, there was some
heated media debate about the International Space Station. The cartoon was of two parts. The first part was an interior view in which
an astronaut was trying to placate a colleague (who was unhappy because the ISS
project was headed in the wrong direction) reasoning out that the current form
of the ISS was the only one for which (President)
The above two examples
shed ample, realistic light on the way decisions get made in the
Although such episodes of US intervention are numerous and dwelling on them would be a side issue, to stress the centrality of the flawed decision-making process to the occurrence of such episodes and the ensuing outcomes, I shall try to put in context the US involvements in Persian Gulf. It will highlight the downside of the current policy process, which is what gets repeated elsewhere, and which ultimately leads to the enmity the US is receiving in the Third World at large. It follows that if the US wants to establish better relations with the rest of the world, it should attend to the root causes that underlie current undesired outcomes; no charm offensives and cosmetic treatments can elicit enduring positive perceptions – the brief positive responses elicited by such charm offensives being no more than expressions of hope on the part of others that the US may at last show some maturity and learn to face situations, only to be disappointed by the usual blame games and the reluctance to face its own shortcomings.
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The beginning of the US involvement in Persian Gulf affairs dates back to the aftermath of the Second World War, when it inherited from Britain the function of defending Western interests and with the CIA-financed coup that toppled Dr Mossadeq, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, and making Mohamed Reza its undisputed ruler – or the Shah. But it was not this event itself that played the decisive role in the subsequent creation of havoc in the country but the events that followed. More specifically, it was the ensuing brutality of Mohamed Reza on the one hand and on the other the US turning a blind eye to that cruelty – democracy and human rights, anyone? And it was these tragedies that increasingly got worse over time that ultimately tilted the balance of power in favour of the religious clerics and paved the path for Imam Khomeini to take the reigns of Iran.
It may not be that the
Americans themselves imposed that brutality on Iranian people, but it certainly
was by the person who had the full support of successive US
administrations. Why was the US turning
a deliberate blind eye to those brutal events?
Simply because Shah Reza was safeguarding US interests in Iran! And this is typical of US behaviour: Create a
mess in other countries and turn a blind eye to the dire consequences! The case of Chile is another example of this
mindset. The CIA-backed overthrow of the
democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende and seizing of
power by the “friendly” government of General Pinochet in 1973 led, ultimately,
to a blood-bath over two decades, with tens of thousand people dead and more made
homeless. And yet successive
Going back to the situation that was in
Iran, and in view of the generic state of affairs wherever US intervention happens,
is it any wonder, then, that a vast majority of Iranians saw the US as the
Great Satan? The clerics didn’t have to
sell the idea to ordinary Iranians; they had internalized the idea on their own
based on the brutal experiences they themselves had at the hands of
The US on its part had been not only utterly oblivious to the suffering of the Iranian people under the brutal regime of its protégé, but made a deliberate effort to decry loudly against Iranians who took a number of Americans hostage. In view of the mindset of the average US citizen as described above, it was not very difficult for various US administrations and its media to inculcate in them a wholly distorted reality – that injustice in Iran began only from the time of hostage-taking, and not before, when thousands of people were tortured and killed in prisons by a US backed government while it did nothing about it. This stage marked the end of what I call the first phase of US involvement in the affairs of Persian Gulf region.
The second phase began
with frantic scrambling by the US to find an ally to replace the now defunct Shah,
who was forced to flee the country. Fortunately
for the
The US on its part was
doing everything it can, without direct involvement, to inflict maximum damage
on Iran. Until Obama’s arrival, the US
chose not to see beyond a confrontationist path. In view of this attitude it is not
far-fetched to surmise even without any tangible evidence (especially given the
case of Kuwait, below) that the US at least gave its tacit approval for
Saddam’s subsequent invasion of Iran, which dragged on for six long years. But it can be said with certainty that Saddam’s
Iraq would have been decisively defeated by Iran had it not been for the helping
hand provided by the US, which included circumvention by Reagan administration of
a ban by Congress to sell arms to Iraq and supplying it arms through third nations;
hindering the selling arms as well as spare parts to Iran by Western powers
(which in turn led Iran to turn to the Eastern Europe to fulfill the need); encouragement
of other Western powers to sell arms to Iraq; and critically, providing
satellites reconnaissance photos of the war-front situation to Saddam on a
regular basis. None of the powers involved
in the region (Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, USSR, and US) wanted to
see Saddam defeated; nor did they want him to have a decisive victory (a prolonged
war is also good opportunity for lucrative arms sales). Help provided by the
Having inflicted
significant damage on
Saddam’s occupation of the whole of Kuwait (rather than its northern third that borders Iraq and contains the Rumailah oil field which straddled the border and about which Saddam had made a fuss some weeks before the invasion, and which perhaps the US considered “fair reward” for his troubles and thus did nothing to discourage him from his intended invasion) raised much apprehension in Washington that the enigmatic Saddam, buoyed by his success in taking over Kuwait, may push further into Saudi Arabia – hence the “line in the sand” and the aptly named “Desert Shield.” Why and how the “Desert Shield” became a “Desert Storm” (not to mention the creation of the totality of circumstances that led to the need for a “shield” in the first place) although intriguing, highlights precisely the kind of flawed decision-making process of the US government, which process produces only reactionary and incremental as opposed to comprehensive decisions, and which this article has been trying to emphasize.
Just as Saddam was
saved from certain defeat but not allowed to have a full victory in the
six-year war with Iran (by controlling arms and vital information), the policy of
both the US and British governments (though the latter’s strategic goals for being
involved also had at least two other entirely different dimensions much more
important to it) in the years following that war was to keep him in a weakened state
without the leeway for maneuvering as freely as he wanted. But Saddam’s taking over the whole of Kuwait
rather than (the tacitly agreed) northern third of the country complicated
matters and presented the administration of Bush Sr with two serious dilemmas. One was regarding Saddam’s unpredictability
and hence his reliability as the guardian of Western interests in Persian Gulf
area, especially regarding his intentions about the other Arab states in the region,
particularly
The indecisiveness that resulted from the two dilemmas did get resolved, however, perhaps due to the jolt provided by the British “iron-lady” Margaret Thatcher who steadfastly called for ousting Saddam from Kuwait (and who also famously admonished Bush Sr with “Now, George, don’t go wobbly on me!”). The task of building a coalition to oust Saddam from Kuwait was made easier by the fact that virtually the whole world saw him as the aggressor (being ignorant of the reality of the situation) and the task of crippling his war machine was enabled by the novel technology of satellite-guided cruise missiles – the high accuracy of which resulted in minimum civilian casualties. Their accuracy also deprived Saddam of the secret weapon he had been counting on – turning the world opinion against the US when the bombing started killing thousands of civilians, which never happened, and thus helped sap the morale of Saddam’s forces which in turn paved the way for their total defeat and expulsion from Kuwait.
There were many calls from
the neo-conservative elements in the US government for moving on straight to
Baghdad, which were ignored in large part for fear of unraveling the coalition
– which came together in principle only to right a wrong. During the following presidency of Bill
Clinton, the same conservative elements renewed their concern about Saddam’s
potential threat to the US interests in Persian Gulf and thus had started to call
for his removal – never mind that they were the same elements which had
supported him against Iran and also had turned a blind eye to his atrocities to
his own citizens. But the idea of
ousting Saddam had not received favour with
And then came 9/11. Not only was a Republican president in the White
House at the time of the tragedy, but the very same neo-conservatives who were calling
for the ousting of Saddam earlier had regained power in the new
administration. After being isolated
from the misery of the world (as we saw, a lot of that misery was caused by the
US itself) Americans suddenly felt a vulnerability they had never experienced
before. In conjunction with this new sense
of vulnerability, the socio-psychological-political dynamics of the way the
American society functions led to carte blanche powers to the
administration. And the failure to
capture Osama bin Laden opened up the opportunity for those who had wanted to
oust Saddam after ousting his forces from Kuwait. This opportunity was further enhanced by
Saddam himself, who should have known better but never did, as usual. For at a time when the US was thumping its
chest declaring that it is now the only super power on the Planet, he just thumbed
his nose at it (by virtue of the cat-and-mouse games he played with weapons
inspectors) and thus provided a further blast of motivation for those who wanted
to get rid of him at any cost. They (and
the British) had reasonably accurate information that Saddam did not have
weapons of mass destruction, but this pretext was used as justification nonetheless
to obtain approval of the Congress (and British parliament) to invade
Iraq. And convincing a public that is
not only not knowledgeable about what goes on around the world but does not
even have an affinity to know (paragraph three) that Saddam and Osama bin Laden
were connected was not difficult – though those who went about doing the convincing
knew full-well that there was no connection.
Conveniently, the state of mind of the majority of Americans lent them
to be prone to be suckers for any information spoon-fed by their
government. (History was repeating
itself – remember
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As mentioned earlier, putting
the US involvement in Persian Gulf in perspective, while with its own merit,
was meant only to illustrate the disjointed nature of decision-making in the US
government. In this context, we might
note that much of the problems in Persian Gulf in the past half-century, ie, since
the beginning of US involvement in its affairs, were outcomes of misguided US
policy, or to put another way, due to a lack of consistent policy. It is therefore clear that among other things,
an integral part of better policy has to be the willingness by the
Even the issue of
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Given that the way the US dealt with Iran to begin with and subsequently with Iraq is typical of the US in dealings with Third World countries; given that this ingrained behaviour invariably brings about typically disastrous outcomes over time; and given that the remedies to such outcomes will be invariably confrontationist with huge costs to everyone, it stands to reason that it would be advisable to look for alternative ways with the capacity to bring about better outcomes. This article clearly illustrates the urgent and important need for a better system of decision-making in US government. And it is equally clear that the current milieu of decision-making in the US government is deficient and does not have much potential for betterment.
To understand the potential of “a better decision-making milieu,” we need to understand the difference between what Dr Peter Senge of MIT in his book titled The Fifth Discipline calls “fundamental” and “symptomatic” solutions. A symptomatic solution addresses symptoms of a situation, while a fundamental solution takes into account its underlying causes and the interrelations among those various causes. Virtually all “solutions” we saw in this article for the problems of Persian Gulf region are characteristically of a symptomatic nature – as such they are partial, incremental, and most importantly, reactionary to a large extent. They don’t take the totality of the situation and the interrelations among the variety of factors into account. To do so, one has to think in a systematic way, that is, in a comprehensive and holistic way.
It is not only the corporate setting (with which Dr Senge dealt with primarily) that employs symptomatic thinking, but much of the thinking at national and international settings also employ this very type of short-term, disjointed, partial, simplistic thinking. We have only recently began to take serious note of how intertwined the world is, not only at the natural, ecological level, but also of relations among nations in an increasingly complex and interdependent world. Thus it is only natural that if we apply symptomatic thinking with limited perceptions onto complex situations that require holistic comprehensive thinking (and which is what we invariably tend to do) we will not only not get sustainable solutions, but we are likely to make matters worse in the medium and longer terms. The recent derailing of the global financial system is a recent prime example of a multitude of individual elements operating on their own seeking to maximize their best interests (which is precisely what is meant by disjointed, incremental thinking, which produces only symptomatic solutions – solutions to immediate needs) and impacting a complex, intertwined system without an overarching and guiding framework. In this regard, an important/crucial point to note for our purposes is that even though the negative outcomes of the global meltdown are obvious to all, the outcomes of misguided government policy (invariably arising from symptomatic solutions) more often than not get submerged in the cacophony of pervasive societal problems and thus their full scale impacts rise to the surface and are discernible only occasionally – like the outcomes of the US involvement in Vietnam (and only in its last years) and the fiasco in Persian Gulf (again with delayed revelations in each of the three phases noted above). The inescapable conclusion one arrives at from this is that the vast majority of the negative outcomes of symptomatic solutions that pervade our lives go undetected and continue to erode societal performance without any the wiser, and as a result, the opportunity for changing that limiting status quo for the better is kept unknowingly blocked.
The paramount need for replacing symptomatic solutions with fundamental solutions in the realm of US government decision-making is therefore clear. And yet such change is virtually impossible under current conditions – the impossibility arising from the very nature of the milieu in which decisions are made. (This is of course the case for the governments of all nations, but here our focus is on the US government, given the impact of its decisions on humanity at large, not only American citizens.) For creating fundamental solutions – ie, solutions that are comprehensive, holistic, and take into account the causes underlying events as well as the interrelations among them – requires time and energy even for the best of minds. Not only is this a luxury unavailable for decision makers under the current pressure-cooker conditions, but those pressures are also likely to produce mindsets that are desensitized to the very need for fundamental solutions. [Addendum: Another critically important aspect that complicates matters and severely limits the ability to generate viable fundamental solutions is the limited mindsets that are the natural outcome of modern specialized education, but despite the fallout from this aspect being of a very much larger magnitude than the negative side of misguided US decision-making on the global society – and the American public – the limited scope of this article does not allow me to tread on that very broad and extremely important topic, which was dealt with subsequently and in some detail in the 22 articles on my sister blog www.rifatafeef.blogspot.com.]
When a new administration is ushered in, its staff are inundated with overwhelming demands – demands accumulated from the past, demands of fitting in and learning the ropes, of the boss, of jockeying for power, and importantly, of keeping public opinion tamed, which is in turn largely shaped by the media, and which in its turn is driven by higher ratings and thus create unrelenting pressures to please the public, leaving very limited scope for tackling unpleasant truths about that public itself – it is thus a vicious cycle that was created by the media in collusion with successive administrations. And this is over and above their assigned formal tasks – which by themselves would indeed be taxing. The outcome of all this is that the members of the top public office in the US are hardly equipped to generate fundamental solutions, and invariably end up with only symptomatic solutions or quick-fixes to almost all matters they encounter. The members of any administration are usually hard workers with a high sense of responsibility but their combined efforts are even remotely sufficient to tame the beast. Frequently, “task-forces” are created for tackling problems deemed too vexing, but even the members of such bodies are under pressures of their own, and although they might garner an impressive array of material related to the problems at hand, even they are unable (and therefore unfit) to generate fundamental solutions to even the assigned tasks, let alone the multitude of other intertwined problems. Besides, the very definition of the mission of a task force – namely, to find a viable solution to a given limited problem – precludes a viable comprehensive solution to that very problem.
Therefore, to generate
comprehensive and fundamental solutions to societal problems, and to explore the
validity and feasibility of national strategic options, it is necessary to
establish a permanent body that is
not subject to the whims of political cycles and has the inherent potential for
performing that vital and extended and exhaustive task – that is, a body removed
from everyday pressures and staffed with people with a broad overview of
problems and situations. Specialized
knowledge can be sought as required from outside sources, with which they ought
to be constantly and intimately in touch anyway. To date, the structure of the
The primary task of
such a supplementary body would be to assess the global condition and how the
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Before concluding, it would
be relevant to comment on President Obama’s policy toward the
[Addendum to the original article: It would be worth mentioning here that my puzzlement/reflection on people’s contradictory behaviour related to what would be generally considered “religious” for over 35 years since my mid-teens was richly rewarded by having delved into behavioural aspects of psychology in the late 1990s and early 2000s – that those behaviours were largely psychological in nature and are not related to formal, established religion, in spite of that religions in general are of a psychological nature; that weak minds that do not have adequate control over their behaviours need excessive religious zeal as a means for overcoming the guilt associated with such behaviours which they know to be in conflict with what they have been taught, or perhaps less often, in conflict with moral norms or simple common sense – a process that psychologists would call “reducing cognitive dissonance” that arise from the conflict between the teachings of their beliefs or moral norms or basic commons sense and their actual behaviours. In this regard, the description by Prophet Mohamed of a “hypocrite” is revealing: “If he talked, he would lie; if he made a promise, he would renege; and if he has been entrusted (with something of value) he will betray (you).” It was due to my frequent observation of this behaviour from those who manifest behaviour of being “religious,” as mentioned above, that I grew curious about the phenomenon. Zealous religious behaviour can therefore be said to be mere psychological crutches or defence mechanisms unconsciously generated for maintaining one’s sanity – for more on this topic, see towards the end of article #22 on the blog mentioned above. It should be noted that such behaviour must operate at an unconscious or at least semiconscious level for it to work as psychological crutches; if their owners become consciously aware of the dynamics involved, the device would become ineffective and they have to devise other crutches to achieve the same ends; or else, they have to change their behaviours in question which was what gave rise to the dissonance in the first place – this process is explained by the Balance Theory in psychology. Thus by inference, those who go overboard with their zealousness (indicative of heightened dissonance) can be said to be psychologically sick (their words and deeds can be compared to verify or refute this claim) and are thus in need of commensurate help. (The above logic is equally applicable to those who we would consider to be “normal” – politicians who are in the habit of excessive lying, for example; they may claim that attending to their respective temples on designated days is for the sake of social appearances, but in reality – and they are unlikely to admit it even to themselves, which self-deception being a necessary condition for the process to be effective, as we saw – the primary purpose of such visits is to “cleanse” themselves and thus reduce their mental dissonance. And they would, by definition, fall into the “weak-minded” category, as mentioned. This mechanism is, of course, relevant for those who have deep-seated beliefs; those who are irreligious have to resort to other means to achieve the same ends – being unduly generous, for example.) While the connection mentioned has been made explicit only in recent times by modern psychology, it must not have been lost on the religious leaders of all stripes since the earliest of times. Hence they must have used their intuitive understanding of this connection for leading or managing their helpless disciples or “flock” – as in “a flock of sheep.” And this understanding had been used over historical time, and is in ample use in the modern times as well, for both self-serving purposes and for the common good. ******** A second mechanism that uses the same underlying psychological phenomenon, namely, cognitive dissonance, arises from the same source, namely, from people’s deep-seated desire to be consistent, and is one of the powerful factors underlying mass conversions – be it religious or political. Thus, for example, if we took part in a political rally on our own volition – and this self-choice is critical; being coerced in a significant way will render the mechanism ineffective – but later had doubts about correctness of our action, mental dissonance arising from the discrepancy will work on our psyches to convince us that attending the rally was the right thing to do. And the more such rallies we attend, the more convinced we will become of the validity of the “cause” and therefore the deeper our belief in it. It can be seen that this is also how we become “religious.” For beginning from childhood on, our attendance to religious functions (along with related dogmas) will get those actions and beliefs firmly ingrained in us, and given this conditioning, we might even sacrifice our lives to promote what we believe – without any thought as to their origins or correctness. The same mechanism also can be seen to be underlying the plethora of numerous social norms as well as much of the business choices we make – one might want to wonder about the deeper psychological reasons behind golf matches so dear to top business brass, apart from rational factors as networking. **** We can see from the two examples above the powerful nature of the psychological forces that drive our lives in general and religious fundamentalism in particular. As detailed in my writings on the blog referred, our psyches are not geared to question the validity of our beliefs, especially given the enormous info overload in our lives and resulting pressures to move along to the next task, nor does the world education system endow us with any understanding about the nature of the situation – in fact, it does not even have a clue about the huge problem presented by this situation, let alone that that crippling problem is really responsible for much of the current sociopolitical turmoil and the resulting misery on a global scale.]
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It is clear from all of the above that the key to a better path lies in understanding the complex nature of the world we live in today, recognizing that the mindset and methodology of the past will not lead toward such a path, and the willingness to adapt to the reality and complexity of the interdependent world that we live in today. It is also clear that much of the misguided actions on the part of the US around the world – and in its domestic policy – are by and large outcomes of inherent dynamics of a deficient system, which is currently geared for producing only symptomatic solutions that do not take account of the totality of situations and the interrelations among the involved elements. Furthermore, it is clear that the suggested structural realignment, if appropriately nurtured, will not only open the path for revitalizing the United States for the twenty-first century but will also help catapult it to unprecedented heights – which will in turn help uplift the wellbeing of humanity at large, given the weight of the US on the global scene.
A nation that wants to
lead in global affairs – that is, followed by others wholeheartedly – should
have standard characteristics that define leadership even on smaller scales, a
sense of fairness and justice being foremost among them. Self-interest may very well induce nations to
consent and go along with an unqualified leader, but it will be laughed at
behind its back. I believe that this was
largely the case with Europe (and also the rest of the world) vis-à-vis the
Many of the facts and figures about
